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as aggregate facts. To do so, we construct a two-sector model where goods from 
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produce ﬁ  nal output. One sector is assumed to have ﬂ  exible nominal wages, 
while nominal wages in the other sector are set using Taylor contracts. We cali-
brate the model to the U.S. economy in 1929, and then feed in monetary shocks 
estimated from the data. We ﬁ  nd that while the model can qualitatively replicate 
the key sectoral facts, it can account for less than a third of the decline in aggre-
gate output. This decline in output is roughly half as large as the one implied by 
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This paper explores the importance of sectoral heterogeneity in evaluating the contribution of
in°exible nominal wages to the Great Depression, particularly during the \Great Contraction"
of 1929-33. A common view is that de°ationary monetary policy combined with nominal wage
rigidity was a key contributing factor to the onset of the Great Depression.1 However, relatively
little work has explored whether this story is consistent with the large shifts in relative prices
and wages observed during the Great Depression. This paper seeks to ¯ll this gap using a
multi-sector model to evaluate the implications of the in°exible nominal wages story for both
aggregate and sectoral outputs, wages, prices as well as labor inputs.
Our paper is motivated by the recent debate over the contribution of high real wages to
the Great Depression. In an important recent paper, Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) employ
a one-sector model with staggered (Taylor) wage contracts, and ¯nd that the U.S. de°ation of
1929-33 combined with in°exible nominal wages can account for roughly 70 % of the decline
in U.S. GDP over 1929-1933. This conclusion has been challenged by Cole and Ohanian
(2001), who document large di®erences in nominal wage movements between agriculture and
manufacturing during the Great Depression. Using a simple two-sector model, they conclude
that the degree of wage rigidity observed in the in°exible share of the U.S. economy can account
for less than a 4 percent decline in real GDP. Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) ¯nd this analysis
unconvincing for several reasons. First, they argue that Cole and Ohanian (2001) overestimate
the size of the °exible sector at between 50 and 72 percent. Second, they argue that the real
wage used signi¯cantly understates the real wages observed in the data. Finally, they argue
that if one assumes that productivity grew at 2% during the decline, like Cole and Ohanian
(2001)do, the ¯nding that real wages had a small impact on aggregate output is not surprising.
This paper contributes to this debate in two ways. First, we argue that the signi¯cant
relative price movements observed between intermediate and ¯nal goods complicates the in-
terpretation of manufacturing real product wages since \cheaper" intermediates should lead
to lower sectoral gross output prices. To illustrate the potential importance of this fact, we
examine data on nominal wages, intermediate and ¯nal good prices, as well as the share of
materials in gross output for the manufacturing sector and several manufacturing industries.
Second, we construct and simulate a two-sector model with intermediate inputs. Given our
interest in evaluating the role of asymmetries in \sticky wages" across sectors, we follow Bordo,
Erceg, and Evans (2000) and introduce staggered wage setting in one sector while assuming
1See, for examples, Bernanke (1995), Eichengreen (1992), Eichengreen (1995), Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), and Temin (1993).
2that wages are free to adjust in the other sector. Since (as documented below) the Great
Depression featured large changes in the relative prices of materials and manufactured goods,
we adopt an input-output structure. This is an important feature for a model exploring the
implications of high real wages since, from the point of view of ¯rms, the relevant real wage
should be given by the ratio of the nominal wage to the (sectoral) gross output de°ator. This
leads us to assume that each of the sectoral goods is used as an intermediate good in the pro-
duction of sectoral goods. The production of each sectoral good thus requires capital, labor,
as well as intermediates produced in the two sectors. The ¯nal output good, which can be
consumed or invested, is produced using goods from both sectors.
To evaluate the quantitative contribution of de°ation and wage rigidity to the Great De-
pression, we follow the methodology of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) and feed the estimated
monetary policy shock into a version of our model calibrated to the U.S. economy in 1929. In
our benchmark calibration the °exible wage sector accounts for roughly 42 percent of GDP.
It is worth emphasizing that we have attempted to incorporate the main criticisms Bordo,
Erceg, and Evans (2001) extend to the Cole and Ohanian (2001) exercise. First, the in°exible
wage sector is relatively large, accounting for 58 percent of GDP. Second, the changes in real
wages are endogenously caused by changes to the money supply's growth rates, allowing us to
compare the real wages predicted by the model to those from the data. Finally, we abstract
from underlying productivity growth.
We ¯nd that the contractionary monetary shocks (starting in 1929) generate a decline in
GDP of roughly 12% over 1929-1933, which is about a third of the observed decline. While this
decline is three times as large as that found by Cole and Ohanian (2001), it is less than half of
the decline in GDP generated by a one-sector version of our model. There are two key reasons
why the two-sector model implies a signi¯cantly smaller decline in GDP. First, as noted by
Cole and Ohanian (2001), the presence of a °exible wage sector partially mitigates the decline
in aggregate output as consumers partially substitute towards the relatively cheaper °exible
good. Secondly, the input-output structure of the model stymies the impact of in°exible wages
in the model. The reason is that the relatively lower price of intermediates from the °exible
wage sector acts similarly to a positive productivity shock. This implies that the decline in
output in the in°exible sector is smaller than the decline in output in the one-sector model.
There is a large literature exploring the possible causes of the Great Depression. Most of
the quantitative model-based macroeconomic analyses involve one-sector models.2 Most closely
2Notable exceptions are Cole and Ohanian (2001), Perri and Quadrini (2002), and Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2003).
3related to this paper are Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) and Cole and Ohanian (2001). Our
paper di®ers in several key respects from the latter. First, we follow Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000) and explicitly model staggered wage setting in the presence of a monetary shock instead
of inputting an exogenously given sequence of real wages into the model. Second, our model has
an explicit input-output structure in the production of sectoral goods, which allows for a better
evaluation of the interaction across sectors. Moreover, we expand the sectoral comparison
beyond nominal wages and compare the predictions of our model for sectoral prices, inputs,
and outputs to the data. Third, our calibration strategy means that the in°exible wage sector
in our experiments is over twice as large as in their benchmark experiment.
Relative to Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), our sectoral framework allows us to compare
the results of the exercise to a more detailed set of data, but more importantly, highlighting
the roll sectoral asymmetries played during the contraction period of the Great Depression.
Moreover, by introducing in°exible ways in di®erent ways we show that their modeling choice
is not innocuous.
The sectoral focus of our paper is also related to a number of older studies which emphasized
the role of relative prices changes. Neal (1942) examined whether movements in relative
prices across manufacturing industries were correlated with industrial concentration or could
be largely accounted for by di®erences in input price movements across industries.3 Means
(1966) paid particular attention to shifts in relative prices across industries. Our paper di®ers
from these earlier studies both in its quantitative theory emphasis as well as in its focus on real
product wages. Finally, this paper is also related to more recent work exploring the impact
of monetary policy on changes in relative prices of goods at di®erent stages of production.
Clark (1999) interprets the impact of monetary shocks using VARs, and ¯nds that monetary
contractions lead to declines in the relative price of less processed to more processed goods,
which is precisely what we ¯nd foe the 1929-33 period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents several facts on
sectoral wages, prices and output. Section 3 presents the model environment and section 4
presents the di®erent numerical experiments.
2 Data
We begin by documenting several facts on sectoral wages, hours, output and prices. A quick
summary: ¯rst, nominal agricultural wages fell compared to manufacturing wages; secondly,
3Lewis (1949) also highlighted the role of relative price shifts, especially on developing economies.
4while agricultural hours remained more or less stable until 1932 and there was little re-
allocation of labor away from it, manufacturing hours fell by almost half; thirdly, in terms of
real production, agricultural gross output remained stable until the \Dust Bowl" years, while
manufacturing gross output plummeted; ¯nally, in terms of prices, while all broad measures of
prices fell, the price of manufactured goods prices fell by less than the price of commodities,
while the price of goods declined relative to that of services.
We go on to gauge the importance of these relative price movements in computing real
wages by backing out implicit value-added de°ators that account for the \pass-through" e®ect
from changes in the price of intermediates. These e®ects are large, highlighting the need for
modeling intermediate usage explicitly, which we go on to do next section.
2.1 Nominal Wages and Hours by Sector
The labor market plays prominently in many explanations of the Great Depression, but sur-
prisingly little attention has been paid to the considerable heterogeneity in both wages and
employment across industries.4 In this section we present evidence supporting two facts: (i)
large movements in nominal wages across industries, which in turn led to large changes in rel-
ative wages across industries; and (ii) this industry di®erence was large compared to post-war
business cycles.
We focus on agriculture and manufacturing wages as hourly wages are largely unavailable
for other sectors. In 1929, value added in agriculture was roughly 10 percent of GDP, while
manufacturing accounted for about 25 percent of GDP. However, the level of employment in
each sector was similar. As Figure 1 illustrates, nominal wages in agriculture declined by
roughly 40 % more than nominal wages in manufacturing in two years.5
Hours worked show the opposite pattern. As ¯gure 2 shows, while there was little decline in
hours worked in agriculture over 1929-1932, hours worked in manufacturing declined by roughly
40 % from their 1929 level. Kendricks (1961) reports estimates of hours worked for agriculture
(including forestry and ¯shing), manufacturing, mining, transportation and communications
(including public utilities) during the interwar period. There is evidence that wages did not
4One recent exception to this is work by Cole and Ohanian (2001), who note that there was substantial
di®erences in relative wages across sectors during the Great Depression.
5The agricultural wage is series K-177 from Historical Statistics of the United States, which is a composite
farm wage index. This series includes the value of room and board received by agricultural workers. The
manufacturing wage data is series Ba4361 from Historical Statistics of the United States, and is an hourly wage
index of production and non-supervisory workers in manufacturing. These ¯gures may slightly understate the
relative decline, as the wage data reported by Alston and Hatton (1991) suggest an even larger decline.
5decline in any of these industries except for agriculture.
2.2 Real Output
There are 2 alternative measures of real sectoral output: gross output and value added. Figure
3 plots an index of real gross output in manufacturing and agriculture. While manufacturing
output was practically halved, total agricultural output declined very little during the initial
years of the Great Depression, with the e®ects of the \Dust Bowl" appearing only after 1932.
The picture for agricultural real GDP looks very di®erent. Figure 4 plots real sectoral GDP in
agriculture and manufacturing. This ¯gure suggests an even larger decline in real sectoral GDP
than the gross output measures, with an especially pronounced di®erence in agriculture. A key
reason for the di®erence is that sectoral GNP de°ators do not exist, so nominal sectoral GDP
is de°ated by the aggregate GNP de°ator. Given this was a period of signi¯cant movements
in relative prices, as documented below, the use of di®erent de°ators matters a great deal for
sectoral measures of real output.
2.3 Sectoral Prices
It is well known that the Great Depression coincided with a substantial de°ation period (1929-
33). What has received less attention (at least in the recent literature) is that this de°ation
was accompanied by large changes in relative prices. These relative price movements resemble
the pattern of relative wages, as the price of commodities fell relative to that of manufactured
goods. Figure 5 plots the wholesale prices for raw materials versus the wholesale price for
manufactured goods.6 While raw materials' prices declined by roughly 40 % over 1929-1933,
manufactured goods' prices declined by only half as much.
The data also suggests that the price of goods declined relative to that of services, as
Figure 6 shows. These measures of consumer prices are from the Cost of Living index. We
combine the Cost of Living indices for food and clothing into a commodity intensive group,
while for services we compute the (weighted) average of shelter, household operations and
sundries/miscelaneous goods.7
6The Wholesale Price Index (WPI) is also shown in the ¯gure. This an index of the prices of a variety of
raw and processed materials, semi-¯nished goods and fully manufactured products. While most of the prices
were for large transactions, not all occurred at the \wholesale" level, although the prices are generally for
transactions below the retail level.
7The weights of these components in the aggregate Cost of Living index is Food 31.6 %, Clothing 14.1 %,
Fuel, Electricity, and ice 6 %, House-furnishings 4.8 %, Miscellaneous 23.7 % and Rent 19.8 %.
62.4 Relative Prices and Intermediate Goods: Implications for Mea-
sured Real Wages and Labor Productivity
The large relative price changes during the Great Depression suggest that movements in gross
output prices could be partially accounted for by changes in input prices.
This possibility, however, is necessarily abstracted from by authors that de°ate nominal
wages using value added de°ators, such as Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), while even those
that consider the real product wage in manufacturing { the ratio of nominal manufacturing
wages to wholesale prices, such as Dighe (1997), largely fail to explore its implications by
not explicitly modeling intermediates. To assess the potential quantitative importance of
relative price movements, we compare a value added production function with a gross output






where Ki is capital and Li is labor used to produce good i. A natural way of introducing a











where Qi denotes intermediate goods and Yi is gross output in industry i.
To derive the linkage between input and output prices we need to make an additional
assumption regarding the nature of the di®erent product markets. Here we assume that ¯rms
are competitive price takers in both input and output markets. In this case, the relationship


































Equation (3) highlights the potential implication of changes in the relative prices of ¯nal
versus intermediates goods (see Figure 5) on wholesale prices. In this Cobb-Douglas example,
each percent decline in the price of intermediates leads to a (1 ¡ ®) percent decline in the
wholesale price level. As a result, if the intermediate share is large, declines in the relative
price of intermediates could lead one to conclude that real product wages in an industry were







Source: Census of Manufacturing,
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
high. As can be seen from Table 1, the intermediate share of gross output was signi¯cant
during the interwar period, averaging roughly 55 percent of gross output in manufacturing
and about 30 percent in agriculture.8
To explore the quantitative importance of this channel, we examine data on manufacturing
wages and prices.9 In practice, we have data on gross output prices and many inputs (especially
materials) from the WPI. Using (3) we can back out the implicit price index for value added:










As a proxy for nominal wages we use the nominal wage series for all of manufacturing from
the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB).10 In Figure 7 we plot the series for the
average hourly earnings of all wage earners divided by the wholesale price index of ¯nished
goods. We also plot two product real wages using a value added price de°ator adjusted for
the impact of intermediate prices as given by equation (4). Both adjustments assume an
intermediate share of 50 percent. As a proxy for the price of intermediates we use the price
index for raw materials in one series and the price index for semi-manufactured in the other.
8The manufacturing numbers slightly underestimate the material share prior to 1935 as contract work was
counted as ¯nal output and not as an intermediate input (see Van Swearington (1939)).
9Aside from data availability issues, this is an informative industry on which to focus since manufacturing
closely tracks the overall fall and slow recovery of output, and most of the literature on real wages in the Great
Depression have focused on manufacturing wages.
10This is also the series Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) use for manufacturing.
8This allows us to to \strip out" the change due to pass-through of lower intermediate costs.
As Figure 7 illustrates, the decline in the relative price of intermediates has a large impact
on the real product wage during the Great Contraction. While the ratio of nominal wages to
the WPI for manufactured goods increases over 1929 to 1933, the real product wage adjusted
for intermediate prices are roughly roughly constant over 1929-31, and decline by between
10 and 20 percent over 1931-33. This picture re°ects two driving forces. As pointed out by
Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) and others, there were few nominal wage reductions before
1931. However, the decline in the WPI for ¯nished goods over 1929-1931 is largely accounted
for by a decline in intermediates. After 1931, a number of manufacturing ¯rms moved to
reduce nominal wages, which combined with a decline in the relative price of intermediates
to ¯nal manufacturing goods led to a reduction in the ratio of nominal wages to the implied
value added de°ator. Because the price of intermediates fell by more than the price of gross
output, manufacturing ¯rms substituted away from labor and capital and into intermediates.
This is exactly the point illustrated by the two-sector model we introduce in section 3.
The distinction between value added and gross output measures also matters for measured
labor productivity. To illustrate this, we plot two alternative measures of labor productivity in
manufacturing in Figure 8. The ¯rst measure is real manufacturing GDP (value added) divided
by an index of hours worked. The second plots an index of real gross output divided by the same
measure of hours. As the ¯gure illustrates, during most of the Great Depression period gross
output labor productivity was well above value added labor productivity in manufacturing.
Moreover, while from 1929 to 1933 gross output labor productivity increased, value added
labor productivity decreased.
2.4.1 Industry Level Data: 8 Manufacturing Industries
In order to explore the impact of intermediate prices on the implied real product wage in more
detail, we now turn to the eight manufacturing industries used in Bernanke (1986) and closely
related to those studied in Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) and Bordo and Evans (1995).11 The
reason for focusing on these industries is that data from the NICB on average hourly wages
and total hours worked, as well as an output based index of gross output from the Federal
Reserve Bulletin are available.12
Table 2 reports the intermediate share of gross output for these eight industries as well as
11Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) and Bordo and Evans (1995) replace meat packing with petroleum and
include the rubber industry.
12Many of the industry level indexes of (gross) output are based on hours worked, rather than on direct
measures of output.
9Table 2: Intermediate Share of Gross Output: Manufacturing industries (%)
Industry 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935
Automobile 62.9 63.3 61.9 65.0 71.5
Boots and Shoes 52.3 53.3 51.6 51.7 51.8
Iron and Steel 57.3 54.1 55.1 55.0 54.7
Meat Packing 87.1 86.5 84.3 80.7 86.0
Paper and Pulp 63.6 60.0 58.1 56.6 60.0
Leather 67.2 70.1 63.7 58.3 64.7
Wool Man 57.3 57.0 52.8 52.6 54.8
Lumber 40.4 32.9 36.2 35.4 40.3
Manufacturing 56.4 55.0 53.3 54.2 57.7
Source: Census of Manufacturing, Statistical Abstract of the United States.
for manufacturing. The intermediate share varied considerably across these industries, ranging
from roughly 40 percent in Lumber to over 80 percent in Meat Packing.13
We begin by reporting two measures of real wages at the industry level during the Great
Contraction. The ¯rst measure reported in Table 3 de°ates this nominal wage using the GNP
de°ator. The second does it using a wholesale price index for output at the industry level. The
two series show a generally similar upward trend, consistent with the view that real wages rose
during the Great Contraction. A closer look suggests some di®erences, as the real product
wages for Wool, Meat Packing, and Lumber all exhibit much larger movements than those
de°ated using the GDP de°ator. These di®erences are primarily due to shifts in relative prices
across industries.
The di®erent movements in industry output prices seem to be closely related to shifts in the
relative prices of intermediate inputs. Table 4 reports industry level wholesale prices for output
and main inputs. The pattern of prices largely lines up with the observation that the prices
of the more processed commodities declined less than those of primary goods. The largest
price declines are in Meat Packing, Leather, Wool and Lumber. The one industry which faced
°at input prices was iron and steel. This re°ects the fact that the input price series places
13In the case of Iron and Steel and Automobiles, the classi¯cations changed slightly in 1931. The intermediate
share was very similar for both classi¯cations.
10Table 3: Real Wages (1929=100)
GNP De°ator WPI
Industry 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Automobile 100 103.5 111.2 111.8 114.4 100 106.5 109.9 98.5 99.8
Boots and Shoes 100 97.3 98.7 103.2 119.0 100 98.3 98.6 99.9 107.5
Iron and Steel 100 104.3 110.4 103.7 104.4 100 107.7 110.8 97.1 96.7
Meat Packing 100 105.8 111.7 106.7 109.2 100 113.7 142.5 156.7 182.8
Paper and Pulp 100 103.4 111.6 110.3 106.5 100 103.5 107.4 101.7 94.8
Leather 100 103.9 109.1 111.8 111.6 100 104.9 109.1 108.1 100.9
Wool Man 100 105.0 110.7 101.7 108.2 100 113.8 126.3 121.9 105.7
Lumber 100 100.4 101.3 90.6 94.4 100 106.4 120.5 113.8 96.1
Manufacturing 100 103.1 108.5 107.7 108.5 100 107.3 117.4 113.4 111.5
Source: The wage data is from the NICB. The GNP de°ator is from Balke and Gordon (1986). The
industry wholesale price de°ators are from various issues of Wholesale Prices.
considerable weight on iron ore and coke, which had very small price declines.14
Using these data on prices, we repeat our earlier exercise and compute a value added de-
°ator which we use to compute industry level real product wages. For each industry we use
the average intermediate share over 1929-33. As can be seen from Table 5, taking into account
intermediate prices matters for real wage movements. In ¯ve of the seven industries, real prod-
uct wages measured using our implied VA de°ator are signi¯cantly below the measure using
the industry's WPI as a de°ator, and actually show decreases through 1932. This industry
level pattern is consistent with the average for all manufacturing, which shows relatively small
movements in real wages over 1929-1933.
Our interpretation of the data is that much of the increase in measured real wages in
manufacturing is a result of a decline in the relative price of intermediates. This suggests
that monetary stories of the great contraction which stress the role of nominal wage rigidities
should be consistent with these sectoral movements in relative prices. In the next section we
address this question in the context of a fully speci¯ed model.
14It is also worth noting that the iron and steel industry featured a signi¯cant degree of vertical integration.
A large fraction of the iron ore production were owned by ¯nal steel producers. On this see Hines (1951).
11Table 4: Industry Wholesale Output and Main Input Price (1929=100)
WPI (GO) WPI (Main Input)
Industry 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Automobile 100 94.2 89.2 88.9 87.9 100 93.9 87.8 83.7 82.8
Boots and Shoes 100 96.0 88.1 81.0 84.9 100 89.5 76.1 57.5 63.1
Iron and Steel 100 93.9 87.8 83.7 82.8 100 101.3 100.6 100.4 98.1
Meat Packing 100 90.2 69.1 53.3 45.8 100 84.1 60.2 45.4 40.9
Paper and Pulp 100 96.9 91.6 84.9 86.2 100 94.1 83.6 70.2 56.3
Leather 100 89.5 76.1 57.5 63.1 100 80.7 53.4 37.3 59.5
Wool Man 100 89.5 77.2 65.3 78.5 100 70.4 51.5 36.9 59.1
Lumber 100 91.5 74.1 62.4 75.4
Manufacturing 100 93.1 81.5 74.4 74.6 100 86.5 67.3 56.5 57.9
Source: The WPI for each industry is given in the appendix. The input price indices are based on
the main input for each industry: Automobile: Iron and Steel, Boots and Shoes: Leather, Iron and
Steel: weighted average of Iron Ore, Coke, Electricity, Coal, Natural Gas; Meat Packing: Livestock
and Poultry; Paper and Pulp: average price of Pulpwood (FOB Pulp Mill); Leather: Hides and Skins
price index; Wool: (computed) index of Raw Wool prices using 1929 WPI weights; Manufacturing:
index of raw materials (the values for the index of semi-manufactured goods are 100, 87.1, 73.5, 63.2,
69.5).
12Table 5: Real Product Wages (1929=100)
VA De°ator (C-D) WPI
Industry 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Automobile 100 105.8 107.0 88.8 90.1 100 106.5 109.9 98.5 99.8
Boots and Shoes 100 91.1 84.0 68.7 77.8 100 98.3 98.6 99.9 107.5
Iron and Steel 100 112.5 119.9 107.8 106.5 100 107.7 110.8 97.1 96.7
Meat Packing 100 78.9 69.7 68.1 101.3 100 113.7 142.5 156.7 182.8
Paper and Pulp 100 99.4 94.6 78.0 52.4 100 103.5 107.4 101.7 94.8
Leather 100 103.9 109.1 111.8 111.6 100 104.9 109.1 108.1 100.9
Wool Man 100 93.7 67.2 70.6 122.4 100 113.8 126.3 121.9 105.7
Manufacturing 100 99.1 103.9 93.5 102.8 100 107.3 117.4 113.4 111.5
Source: The wage data is from the NICB. The industry wholesale price de°ators are from various
issues of Wholesale Prices. The implied VA de°ators are computed using the industry WPI and the
main input price de°ators described in Table 4. The manufacturing input price series used here is
the one for semi-¯nished materials.
3 A Two-sector Model
There are two sectors in the economy that di®er in the way their wages adjust. As we make
clear below, sector 1 has °exible wages, while sector 2 has \sticky" wages. To facilitate the
comparison of our results with the literature, the structure of the sticky wage sector draws
heavily upon Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000).
Both sectors use capital and labor as well as intermediate goods (produced by both sectors)
in production. The output of the two sectors is then combined into aggregate output that can
be used as consumption and/or investment.
A key issue in any sectoral model is the question of how to model sectoral reallocation. We
assume that labor cannot move across sectors. This is consistent with the low reallocation of
labor across sectors during the 1930s. Households supply one unit of labor inelastically. This
means that while in sector 1 the wage rate adjusts to clear the market, in sector 2 the labor
market fails to clear, resulting in unemployment.
133.1 Environment
3.1.1 Households
The economy is populated by a stand-in household with preferences over streams of consump-
tion of the ¯nal good, fCtg
1






, where Pt is the price level
associated with one unit of the ¯nal good. The household chooses consumption, nominal bond
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Ki;t+1 = (1 ¡ ±i)Ki;t + Ii;t; i = 1;2; (7)
Qi;t¡1 = Qii;t¡1 + Qij;t¡1; i = 1;2; (8)
Q
b
i;t = minfQ1i;t;»1Q2i;tg; i = 1;2; (9)
where R is the nominal interest rate on bonds, Ji is the rental rate of capital in sector i, Ii is
investment in sector i, Wi is the nominal wage rate in sector i, Li is hours worked in sector i,
¼i are nominal pro¯ts from sector i, and X is a lump-sum cash transfer from the government.
The household owns the capital stock, and chooses its level one period in advance.
This problem assumes the following timing structure: the household purchases intermediate
goods from both sectors, Q1 and Q2, at prices P1 and P2, respectively. In the next period it
decides how much of the intermediates bought from each sector will be allocated to each
sector (Qij denotes intermediates produced by sector i and to be used in sector j) subject to
the feasibility constraints Qi;t¡1 = Qii;t+Qij;t. The intermediates are then \bundled" according
to a Leontie® technology Qb
i;t = minfQ1i;t;»1Q2i;tg and sold to ¯rms at prices P b
1;t and P b
2;t.
143.1.2 Firms
Firms in both sectors rent capital, labor services, as well as intermediate goods from the

















i;t ¡ Ki;tJi;t ¡ Wi;tLi;t;
where Qb
i is the \bundle" of intermediate goods used in sector i.
While wages are perfectly °exible in sector 1, they are subject to Taylor-type contracts in
sector 2.15 Labor is divided into equally-sized cohorts, and in each period only the wages of a











where Ái are cohort weights that sum to 1.
In turn, the contract wage, xt, depends on the average wage, W2;t, as well as on the distance
between current hours and steady-state labor, ¹ L2, in the following way:
logxt = Á0 logW2;t + °(L2;t ¡ ¹ L2) + Et
n
Á1 logW2;t+1 + °(L2;t+1 ¡ ¹ L2)
+ Á2 logW2;t+2 + °(L2;t+2 ¡ ¹ L2) + Á3 logW2;t+3 + °(L2;t+3 ¡ ¹ L2)
o
; (11)
where ° is a labor-gap adjustment parameter to be estimated.


























L2;t+k ¡ ¹ L2
¢o
: (12)
15The Taylor contract environment makes our results directly comparable to those of Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans (2000). In section 4.2 we explore whether the results are robust to the introduction of Calvo-type wage
contracts.
153.1.3 Aggregate economy
Final output is produced by combining the two sectoral goods according to the following
production function:
Yt = (´(Y1;t ¡ Q1;t)
½ + (1 ¡ ´)(Y2;t ¡ Q2;t)
½)
1=½ ; (13)
where ½ < 1 and the elasticity of substitution is ¾ = 1
1¡½:
The ¯nal good can be transformed into consumption or allocated to investment in either
sector:
Yt = Ct + I1;t + I2;t; (14)
and the laws of motion for capital are subject to a common depreciation rate: Ki;t+1 =
(1 ¡ ±)Ki;t + Ii;t for i = 1;2:
The problem of the ¯nal good producer can be written as
max¼t = Pt (´(Y1;t ¡ Q1;t)
½ + (1 ¡ ´)(Y2;t ¡ Q2;t)
½)
1=½ ¡ P1;t(Y1;t ¡ Q1;t) ¡ P2;t(Y2;t ¡ Q2;t);
and the FOC are:
~ Pi;t = ~ PtY
1¡½
t ´(Yi;t ¡ Qi;t)
½¡1; i = 1;2: (15)
3.1.4 Money
The stock of money is exogenously determined. The growth rate of the stock of money is
assumed to follow an AR(1):
gt = logMt ¡ logMt¡1; (16)
gt+1 = g0 + ½mgt + ²t+1; (17)
where the innovation ²t+1 is iid N(0;¾2
g).
3.2 Equilibrium
Given the law of motion for the growth rate of money, the nominal variables are non-stationary.
With that in mind, we rescale them by the stock of money. Let ~ Pt = Pt
Mt, ~ Bt = Bt





Mt, ~ Wit =
Wit
Mt , and ~ xit =
xit
Mt.








~ Jt; ~ Pt; ~ Pi;t; ~ P
b




such that households, ¯rms in each sector and ¯nal good producers all solve the problems
described above subject to market clearing conditions. In particular, in any equilibrium for
this model speci¯cation, Bt = 0, as there is one representative household; ¼i;t = 0, as the
sectoral technologies are CRS; and the government transfer has to equal the newly printed
money: Xt = Mt ¡ Mt¡1.





























































+ 1 ¡ ±
!#
: (23)
From the ¯rm's problem in sector i = 1;2:










































The ¯nal producer's ¯rst-order conditions (15), the wage setting equations (10), and (11),
the growth rate of money equation (17) and the feasibility and market clearing conditions
17for goods and intermediates complete the set of necessary conditions. We solve the model by
log-linearizing these conditions around the non-stochastic steady-state and then applying the
techniques described in Uhlig (1999).
3.3 Parameterization
Since one of our goals is to compare the quantitative implications of the multi-sector model
with the one-sector model of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001), we follow their approach in
calibrating common parameters.
We assume that each of the four contract periods lasts for one quarter. We set ¯ = 0:99,
which implies an annual risk-free return of roughly 4%. The depreciation rate of capital is
set to 0:025, which implies an approximate annual depreciation rate of 0:1. We assume that
both sectors in the economy have the same capital share of value added of 30%, and set
µ1 = µ2 = 0:3.
Our raw money supply measure of M1 is from Friedman and Schwartz (1963) (Table A-1).
We proceed in two steps: ¯rst, we estimate the parameters in the money growth rate's law of
motion, equation (17), from the ¯rst quarter of 1923 to the last quarter of 1928. The reason we
do not go back further is that the period from 1920 to 1922 was also one of unusually depressed
economic activity, which caused the Federal Reserve Bank to react to it during 1922, a year
that exhibits unusually high monthly growth rates of the money supply. The estimates we
obtain are ^ g0 = 0:0035 and ^ ½m = 0:39. Although this is not used anywhere in the model, the
standard deviation of the residuals was ^ ¾² = 0:0111.
Mapping the input-output production structure to the data is challenging due to data
limitations. One obvious issue is how to allocate industries between the °exible and in°exible
sector given the limited data on sectoral wages and prices. In addition, since real-economy
production structures feature multiple horizontal and vertical production stages, the mapping
of industries into our environment is not immediately clear.16 Given the uncertainty raised by
these issues, our approach is to choose parameter values in our benchmark calibration where
we err on the side of giving the in°exible wage channel the best chance of having a large
quantitative e®ect.
We assume that Agriculture, Construction, Trade, and half of Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate (FIRE) and Services are °exible price sectors. In 1929, these sectors accounted for
16To illustrate this, consider an industry such as Boots and Shoes. On the one hand, essentially all of the
intermediate goods used in Boots and Shoes are from manufacturing. However, over half of the value of these
inputs is for materials (hides) used in leather tanning.
18Table 6: Sectoral statistics
Sectors Share in GDP Share of VA Share of Sector 1 Int.
Agriculture 0.098 0.49 0.69
Construction 0.044 0.57 0.10
Trade 0.155 0.77 0.25
FIRE 0.148 0.77 0.25
Services 0.101 0.77 0.25
Manufacturing 0.252 0.45 0.35
Transportation 0.076 0.66 0.26
Communications 0.032 0.77 0.25
Government 0.059 0.77 0.25
Mining 0.024 0.83 0.10
Source: See text.
roughly 42% of (value-added) GDP. We assign Manufacturing, Transportation and Communi-
cations, Government, Mining, and half of FIRE and Services to the in°exible wage sector, thus
accounting for the remaining 58% of GDP. Agriculture is a relatively natural choice for the
°exible sector because of its well documented wage behavior. Construction, Trade, (retail and
wholesale), FIRE and Services are more ambiguous. One especially important feature these
industries share with agriculture, and the reason they are included in the °exible sector, is the
large share of employment accounted for by self-employed agents.17
Given our input structure, we also have to assign values to the sectoral contributions of
gross-output. To do so, we use data from the 1929 input-output table for the U.S. economy
reported by Leontief (1951) as well as sectoral data from the Historical Statistics of the United
States and Statistical Abstracts of the United States. Since Leontief (1951) does not distinguish
between investment and consumption goods, we assume that °ows from steel works and rolling
mills and other iron and steel electric manufacturers to other industries represents the °ow in
investment goods, which we assign to ¯nal output.
For the °exible sector, the most detailed data available is for agriculture. In 1929, roughly
35% of the value of gross output for agriculture was accounted for by °exible sector intermedi-
17In section 4.1.2 we show that our results are not very sensitive to the size of the °exible and in°exible
sectors.
19ates, with another 16% being accounted for by other intermediates (Leontief (1951)).18 Based
on this, we set the share of value added in gross output in agriculture to (1¡0:35¡0:16) = 0:49,
and the share of intermediates of sector 1 in total intermediates to 0:35
0:35+0:16 = 0:69:
The 1930 Census data for Construction implies a value added share of 0.57. Construction
uses very little °exible sector inputs. We make the educated guess that their share is 10% (we
use the same number for mining). For trade, using Census data for 2002 on business expenses,
we get a value added share of 77% and a share of °exible intermediates of 25%, and make the
assumption that these shares are fairly constant over time. We assume that the numbers for
FIRE, Services, Communications and Government are the same as for trade.
For manufacturing and transportation we use data reported in Leontief (1951) and the Sta-
tistical Abstract of the U.S. to estimate their value added shares (0:45 and 0:66, respectively)
and their share of sector 1 intermediates (0:35 and 0:26, respectively).19 Finally, we use the
average share of value added in mining in 1919 and 1954 (Table Db1-11, Historical Statistics
of the United States), which was 0.83.
To convert these values into sector averages, we weigh each of these industry shares by the
value added share for that sector. This implies an intermediate share in sector 1 of 1 ¡ ®1 =
0:316, 39% of which is allocated to sector 1 intermediates. For sector 2, the intermediate share
is 1 ¡ ®2 = 0:384, with 31 % being allocated to sector 1 intermediates. Finally, the value of ´
is chosen so that the value added share of sector 1 in GDP is equal to 0:42.
In terms of substitutability between sectoral goods in the ¯nal good aggregator, we start
with the benchmark case of ½ = ¡1, which implies an elasticity of substitution of ¾ = 1
1¡½ = 0:5,
and go on to do some sensitivity analysis.
Finally, ° is the crucial parameter regulating how sluggishly nominal wages in the in°exible
sector adjust. We follow Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000)'s strategy of estimating it so as to
minimize the distance between the real wages in the model's in°exible sector and the real
wages in manufacturing from 1929 to 1933.
A summary of all the parameter values appears in table 7.
18We exclude manufacturing °ows from the iron and steel industry, since these are most likely to represent
capital goods.
19We exclude manufacturing °ows from the iron and steel industry, since these are most likely to represent
capital goods.
204 Results
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we begin by looking at the impulse response functions.
Figures 9, 10, and 11 depict the response of sectoral values, intermediates, and aggregate
variables, respectively, to a one percent decrease in the growth rate of money. On impact, the
nominal wages in sector 2 cannot fully adjust, therefore the real product wage (the ratio of the
nominal wage to the sectoral output price) in sector 2 increase by almost as much as the fall in
sector 2's price. As capital and intermediates are ¯xed on impact, this leads to a decrease in
sector 2 labor. Overall, this leads to a fall in sector 2 gross output. More importantly, because
labor is relatively more expensive than intermediates, distorted ¯rms substitute away from it
and into intermediates (as labor decreases by three times as much as intermediate usage, Qb
2).
In sector 1, in contrast, prices fully adjust to the decrease in the growth rate of money
supply. Since labor is ¯xed in this sector, on impact nothing happens, while the subsequent
decline in sector 1's output can be attributed to two channels. First, the sharp decrease in
sector 1's price causes the real product rental rate of capital to rise, lowering investment in
sector 1. Second, the increase in the relative price of sector 2 goods increases the price of
sector 1's intermediate bundle. This leads to lower intermediate usage (see Figure 10), which
acts as a negative productivity shock in Sector 1. Note, in particular, how sector 1's use of
intermediates, Qb
1, declines much more than that of sector 2.
The implications for sectoral prices and real wages are worth noting. Prices in the °exible
sector fall more than those in the distorted sector; real wages in the distorted sector go up on
impact and then fall, while in the °exible sector they go down and then up back to steady-
state. This pattern of relative prices and wages is qualitatively consistent with the one observed
during the Great Contraction.
Figure 11 compares the impulse response functions for the multi-sector and the one-sector
models in terms of aggregates.20 Notice that in the one-sector model, output falls by around
three times as much as in the multi-sector model. The two main channels at play are: (i) while
in the one-sector model the whole economy is distorted, in the multi-sector model resources
can be directed to the non-distorted sector. The amount of resources that get redirected
depends not only on the substitutability at the ¯nal good level but also on factor mobility
across sectors. In trying to give the monetary shock story as much of a chance as possible, we
do not allow labor to move from the distorted sector to the undistorted one (in fact there is no
evidence that it did); and (ii) while in the one-sector world ¯rms cannot substitute away from
20The calibration for the one-sector model keeps the common parameters and reestimates °. It is shown in
table 8.
21the more expensive labor into intermediates, that channel is open in the multi-sector world.
Again, the extent to which such channel is used depends not only the elasticity of substitution
between intermediates and the value added component, but also on the elasticity of substitution
between the types of intermediates themselves (recall from the price panel in ¯gure 9 that the
price of undistorted goods falls by more than that of distorted ones). While the Cobb-Douglas
structure we have between intermediates and value added in sectoral production allows for a
fair degree of substitution and is consistent with the little movement in shares we see in table
1, we will relax that assumption below and allow for less substitutability.
4.1 Simulation
The main experiment involves simulating both the one- and two-sector models. The inputs
are the money supply growth shocks starting in the third quarter of 1929. We assume that
the economy was at its steady-state in the second quarter of 1929. As can be seen from ¯gure
12, the one-sector model does a very good job of accounting for the fall in output. This
leads Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) to conclude that the contractionary monetary shock can
account for the majority of the output decline observed over 1929-1933.21
The multi-sector model o®ers a slightly di®erent view of the role of monetary shocks.
Speci¯cally, we highlight two key ¯ndings. On one hand, as in Cole and Ohanian (2001),
monetary shocks have a much smaller impact on output in the multi-sector world, and can
account for only about a third of the decline in output, from peak to trough, but on the other
hand, when combined with di®erential nominal wage rigidities across sectors, contractionary
monetary shocks are qualitatively consistent with the pattern of relative prices, output and
wages observed in the data. The two ¯ndings together suggest that while the nominal wage
rigidity mechanism may have played a signi¯cant role in this period, contractionary monetary
shocks cannot account for the entire story.
Why is the decline in output smaller than in the one-sector world? As highlighted in our
description of the impulse response functions above, the multi-sector model o®ers two channels
which reduce the impact of nominal wage rigidity. First, the presence of a °exible wage sector
attenuates the e®ect of the increase in real wages in the distorted sector; it acts like an \escape
valve" at the ¯nal good level provided some substitution is possible. This e®ect was highlighted
in Cole and Ohanian (2001). The second channel is that the presence of intermediates partially
o®sets the e®ects of high real wages in sector 2, as the lower relative price of sector 1 goods
21The aggregate data is from Balke and Gordon (1986).
22reduces the price of the intermediate bundle relative to the output price. This acts similarly
to a positive productivity shock. Firms in the distorted sector can partially substitute away
from more expensive labor by using more intermediates. This is a novel e®ect, one that comes
about because we explicitly incorporate an input-output structure.
Unlike the one-sector model, the multi-sector model can fully accounts for the decline in the
nominal price of the ¯nal consumption/investment good. In a frictionless, one-sector world,
the price level would fall by as much as the stock of money. When nominal wages are sluggish,
output is comparatively more costly to produce as a result of a contractionary monetary shock,
and the fall in the price level is smaller. In contrast, in a multi-sector world, the price level
falls further because it is, loosely speaking, an average of the two sectoral prices, where one of
the sectors is undistorted and therefore experiences larger price decreases.
The multi-sector model is also qualitatively consistent with the relative movements in prices,
wages and output across sectors. Figure 13 compares the °exible sector simulation with data
drawn from agriculture. The model is unable to match the initial increase in real output in
the °exible sector, although it tracks the real product wage reasonably well over the 1929-1933
period. The model accounts for roughly half of the decline in the price of the °exible good.
Figure 14 reports the simulation results for sector 2 (the in°exible wage sector) and com-
pares it to manufacturing data. The model accounts for roughly a ¯fth of the decline in gross
output and a third of the decline in labor. The smaller declines in sectoral output and labor
than the ones observed in the one-sector model follow because while the output price declines,
it does so by less than the price of the sector 1 good. As a result, both the relative price of
capital as well as the price of the intermediate bundle (relative to the price of the sector 2
good) decline as the two bottom panels in ¯gure 15 show, so sector 2 ¯rms's capital decreases
by less than it does in the one-sector world and the use of intermediates decreases by less
than the use of labor. This partially o®sets the decline in labor, thus increasing the marginal
product of labor by more than what happens in the one-sector model. As a result, the model
does a good job of matching the real product wage with a much smaller decline in labor.22
4.1.1 The importance of substitutability
In going from a one-sector world to a two-sector one with intermediates we are adding two
substitutability margins. One is at the ¯nal good production level, the other at the sectoral
level, when ¯rms decide between using more \value added" inputs (capital and labor) or more
22In the benchmark experiment of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) labor falls by more than in the data.
23of the intermediate bundle. There is a further margin we are shutting down: the substitution
between di®erent types of intermediates follows a Leontie®-type technology.23
To gauge the relative importance of these two margins we build a two-sector economy with
no intermediates that is identical to our benchmark economy in everything else. In the top-left
panel of ¯gure 16 we see that the all-important margin is the possibility of substituting at the
¯nal good level, as output declines by almost as much with and without intermediates.
This result is predicated on the calibration we have, though. As we make it harder to
substitute at the ¯nal good level, by setting ½ = ¡3 and therefore halving the elasticity of
substitution, the top-left panel of ¯gure 17 shows that the importance of explicitly including
intermediates increases substantially.
4.1.2 Sensitivity analysis
We have opted for modeling the usage of sectoral intermediates in ¯xed proportions because
we think the higher the level of disaggregation, everything else being the same, the smaller the
elasticity of substitution. Moreover, because we are looking at a relatively short period of time
(1929-1933), it is unlikely that large adjustments in the mix of intermediates could take place.
Nonetheless, to make sure this assumption does not drive our results we computed the same
experiment with a Cobb-Douglas technology at the level of intermediates so that production














¢1¡®i for i = 1;2; (27)
where we calibrate the parameters !i to obtain the same income shares of intermediates shown
in table 7.
As the top left panel in ¯gure 19 shows, the di®erence from the benchmark economy in
terms of output is small. Any elasticity of substitution that is lower than one would, of course,
lie in between the two lines shown in the ¯gure.
We also conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to the other parameters in the model.
These results are in the various panels of ¯gure 19. Of particular importance is the elasticity
of substitution at the ¯nal good level as the top-left panel shows. While, from a partial
equilibrium perspective, one might think that decreasing the elasticity of substitution between
sectors at the ¯nal good level would lead to a larger decrease in aggregate GDP as ¯nal good
producers are less able to substitute toward the relatively cheaper °exible good, this is not
23Section 4.1.2 shows that our results are not very sensitive to this assumption.
24what happens. General equilibrium e®ects change relative prices so that the °exible good price
falls by less, while the in°exible good price falls by more, the end result being that aggregate
output actually falls by more.
The two bottom panels also deserve a closer look. They report the results of relaxing the
Cobb-Douglas structure between value added components and intermediates. The sectoral
















½i ; i = 1;2;
and we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to ½i, with ½i = 0 being our benchmark. If
we restrict the degree of substitutability in each of the sectors, if anything, we get even less
action in GDP.
4.2 Calvo-style wage setting
The Taylor contract equation (11) is arguably an ad-hoc way of determining wages and lacks
any sort of micro-foundation. We use it here to be able to compare our results to those of
Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000). An alternative to this approach that has both gained traction
in the literature and is micro-founded, is Calvo-style wage setting as in Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000).
We modify our economy to introduce in¯nitely many households (indexed by h on the unit
interval) that supply di®erentiated labor services to the sticky sector (sector 2). Firms in sector
2 regard each household's labor services L2;t(h), h 2 [0;1] as imperfect substitutes.
Households derive utility from streams of the ¯nal good, leisure, and real balances. Ev-
ery period, households choose consumption, Ct(h), hours in sector 2, L2;t(h), nominal bond
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Ki;t+1(h) = (1 ¡ ±i)Ki;t(h) + Ii;t(h); i = 1;2; (31)
where the notation is the same as before. Households supply ¹ L1 units of sector 1 hours
inelastically, but they are competitive monopolists in supplying sector 2 hours. Labor in sector
2 is subsidized at rate ¿w
2 so that in steady-state, the tax exactly o®sets the monopolistic
distortion associated with the markup in sector 2 wages.
Every period a given household will be able to reset its wage with probability (1 ¡ µw),
making the duration of each wage contract randomly determined. For households that do
not adjust, their nominal wage grows at the unconditional mean rate of gross in°ation 1 + ¹ g.
Letting W2;t(h) denote the nominal wage for an household of type h, this means the nominal
wage of a household whose wage has not been adjusted in j periods since period t is W2;t+j(h) =
W2;t(h)¦j. The contract adjusting probability is independent of the number of periods that
have gone by without adjustment, and of the state vector. This implies a constant fraction
(1 ¡ µw) of households adjusts their contracts at any point in time.
We need to assume full consumption (but not leisure) risk sharing across households so that
consumption is the same across all households Ct(h) = Ct: Moreover, all households resetting
their wage in a given period will choose the same wage rate.
The production function for sector 2 ¯rms is the same as before, but they now hire a \lump"



























Assuming separable utility in all 3 arguments, from the households' problem:
0 = ¯






¡ ¸t + Et¸t+1; (36)
0 = ¡¸t + Et¸t+1(1 + Rt): (37)
An household h that is able to reset its contract wage, maximizes utility with respect to
W2;t(h). This maximization is subject to the budget constraint as well as the demand for labor
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where ¸t+j(h) are the multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the labor demand
condition has been substituted in. Using (35), (33), letting (1+ ¿w
2 ) = ²w
²w¡1 and MRSt+j(h) =
¡
UL(L2;t+j(h))
UC(Ct+j) yields, after some algebra and log-linearization (small caps):












where we are using the convention that for j = 0, ¹ g
Pj
k=1 ^ gt+k = 0:


























Recalling that because of our insurability assumption Ct+j(h) = Ct+j; we can write the per-
centage deviations in the marginal rate of substitution in period t+j for a household that last
27updated its wage in period t as mrst+j(h) = ¾cct+j¡¾Ll2;t+j(h). On the other hand, let the econ-
omy's average marginal rate of substitution be given by mrst+j = ¾cct+j ¡¾Ll2;t+j. Then, log-
linearizing (33) in period t+j, we get l2;t+j(h)¡l2;t+j = ¡²w
³





This allows us to write:
mrst+j(h) = mrst+j ¡ ¾L (l2;t+j(h) ¡ l2;t+j)
= mrst+j + ¾L²w
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Recalling the wage mark-up is zero in steady-state, de¯ne the percentage deviation in the
mark-up as ¹w
t+j ´ ~ w2;t+j ¡ ~ pt+j ¡ mrst+j: Using the law of iterated expectations and the
de¯nition of ~ w2;t+1(h), we get
~ w2;t(h) = (1 ¡ ¯µw)
µ








Et ~ w2;t+1(h); (42)
or, in terms of the original variables:
~ w2;t(h) = (1 ¡ ¯µw)
µ
~ w2;t + ¯µw¹ gEt^ gt+1 ¡








From (34), the average wage in sector 2 is:
W2;t =
£
µw (W2;t¡1(1 + ¹ g))

































We calibrate this economy so that its steady-state coincides with the one in our benchmark
economy. This means that all common parameters are unchanged and we set ¾c = 1 and
¾m = 1 so as to have log preferences in consumption and real money balances like before. We
set ¾l such as to get total market hours to be one third.24 We set µw = 0:6 so that average
contract duration is 1+µw




As can be seen from ¯gure 20 the model is unable to deliver a sizable output decrease as a
result of the observed monetary contraction. This happens because real wages in the distorted
sector of this Calvo economy are not increasing by as much as they were in our benchmark
economy (see ¯gure 14). In fact, to match the same real wage increase we need to set the
parameter regulating the fraction of households that get to adjust their wages (or equivalently
the duration of the wage contracts) to the implausibly high level of µw = 0:99, implying only
1% of households adjust their wages each quarter and contracts last for 199 quarters. Even
then, as ¯gure 21 shows, output falls by less than half as much as in the data.
We conclude from this experiment that much of the action in output we see in the bench-
mark economy hinges on the Taylor-contract speci¯cation. This is unfortunate because there
is little or no motivation to favor such a ad-hoc speci¯cation over the Calvo setting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we document sectoral asymmetries regarding nominal wages, prices, hours worked
and output in the US during the Great Depression. We argue that the pass-through e®ect from
changes in the prices of intermediates is quantitatively meaningful and therefore one should use
a multi-sector model with intermediates to understand any changes operating through a real
wage-type channel. To do this we use the data to discipline a multi-sector model that helps
us understand whether monetary contractions coupled with slow adjusting wages in one of
the sectors, can account for the observed fall in aggregate (value added) output. We conclude
24This yields ¾l = 2:46.
25See Dixon and Kara (2006) for a discussion on how to compare contract duration between Taylor and
Calvo worlds.
29such an explanation falls short because the substitution margins a two-sector model introduces
(both at the ¯nal good level as well as at the inputs level) are important and do away with
most of the fall in output a one-sector model predicts. Nonetheless, the model can qualitatively
address most the observed heterogeneity in the data.
We also examine whether the results obtained from the one-sector model are robust to
di®erent speci¯cations of the wage setting mechanism. We ¯nd that they are not. While a
Taylor-type wage setting mechanism results in losses in output that are close to the ones ob-
served in the data, as in Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), a Calvo-type wage setting mechanism
parameterized to yield the same contract duration delivers no such result.
We take these results to mean that future work, whether focusing on ¯nding an alternative,
plausible, ampli¯cation mechanism for the contractionary monetary shocks, or studying a new
underlying change, should take the sector heterogeneity that is the focus of this paper seriously.
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33Table 7: Calibration: common parameters
Parameter Value Moment matched
¯ 0.99 Annual risk-free rate 4%
± 0.025 Annual depreciation rate 10%





®1 0.684 Intermediates share in GO 32%
®2 0.616 Intermediates share in GO 38%
´ 0.426 Sector 1 share in GDP 42%
»1 0.86 Sector 1 share of intermediates 39%
»2 0.61 Sector 1 share of intermediates 31%
° 0.0031 Estimated
µ1 0.3 Capital income share of VA 30%
µ2 0.3 Capital income share of VA 30%
Table 8: Calibration: one sector model
Parameter Value Moment matched
° 0.0037 Estimated
µ 0.3 Capital income share of VA 30%
34Figure 1: Relative agricultural wage








Figure 2: Hours worked












35Figure 3: Sectoral gross output












Figure 4: Sectoral value added














36Figure 5: Prices by processing stage





























37Figure 7: Real product wage













Figure 8: Labor productivity: manufacturing











38Figure 9: Impulse response: sectoral















































39Figure 10: Impulse response: intermediates













































40Figure 11: Impulse response: aggregate
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Wage data: The agricultural wage data is a weighted average of the wage of agricultural employees
and an estimate of the average wages of self-employed farmers. Taking into account the earnings of
self-employed in agriculture is important since self-employed workers accounted for between 66 and 72
percent of the full-time equivalent workers in agriculture during the Great Depression.26 Moveover,
agriculture had a large share of self-employed compared to the rest of the economy, as over half of all
self-employed workers during the 1930s were in the agricultural sector.
Hours data: To construct the hours series for farm proprietors we use the product of average
hours worked in agriculture per week in 1929 and 1937 times an index of average hours multiplied
by total employment. The average wage of the self-employed is the ratio of proprietors income
in agriculture (from NIPA) divided by the constructed hours series. The real product wage for
agriculture is the weighted average of the wage paid to agricultural workers and imputed average
wage of proprietors divided by the index of farm output prices.
Industry data: The eight industries' data reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4 are from several di®erent
sources. Industrial output is from the Federal Reserve Board, while data on value added, gross output
and intermediates is from the Census of Manufacturing (as reported in various issues of Statistical
Abstract of the United States). The price data is primarily from various issues of Wholesale Prices.
We brie°y summarize the data sources for each industry.
Automobiles: The Federal Reserve gross output index for automobiles was based on production
data for a selected list of models. The weight in the overall index was 4:79. Data on the major input
sources were obtained from Leontief (1951). The largest source of intermediates was the automobile
sector (25 % of gross output), followed by iron and steel (16 %) and other industries (15 %). As a
rough proxy, we use the price index of iron and its products as the input price index.
Iron and Steel: The Federal Reserve gross output index for iron and steel products was comprised
of pig iron production (0:87
11 ) and steel ingot production (10:13
11 ). The wholesale price index for iron and
steel includes the price of iron ore (see Wholesale Prices 1931). This is unfortunate, since pig iron
is produced using iron ore and energy inputs. In turn, pig iron (and scrap iron) are key inputs into
the production of steel. It is also worth noting that the iron and steel industry featured a signi¯cant
degree of vertical integration. A large fraction of the iron ore production was owned by ¯nal steel
producers (see Hines (1951)). The price index for intermediates is a weighted average of price indexes
for iron ore (0.29), Coke (0.276) Electricity (0.166), Gas (0.154) and Coal, bituminous (0.112). The
weights are based on data from the Canadian iron and steel industry for 1933.
Leather Tanning and Finishing: The Federal Reserve gross output index for leather and products
was comprised of leather tanning and shoe production indices. The leather index used here is the
26This value may be an underestimate, since unpaid family members are excluded from this calculation.
51Leather Tanning. This index was the weighted average of three sub-indexes: (i) production of cattle
hide leathers; (ii) production of calf and kip leathers; and (iii) production of goat and kid leathers. The
weights for each component were: (0:54
0:92; 0:16
0:92; 0:22
0:92). Mack (1956) discusses the production structure
of the leather industry. She reports that hides and skins accounted for the majority of material costs
in leather tanning (nearly 90%). Based on this, it seems reasonable to use the price index of hides
and skins as a measure of material costs in leather tanning and the price index for leather as the
gross output price.27 The source of these price indexes are various issues of the monthly Labor Review
(in the articles on \Wholesale Prices") as well as various issues of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
annual (bulletins) publication Wholesale Prices. Data on leather & hide and tanning & ¯nishing
is also available for recent census years. Interestingly, in 1997, the values are quite similar to the
interwar values. The material share of gross output was roughly 69%, and hides and skins accounted
for $1,4487,834 of the $2,325,541 spent on materials (roughly 65%).
Boots and Shoes: The Federal Reserve gross output index for shoe production was a component
of the leather and products index (with weight (1:36
2:28).) We use the gross output data from the
Manufacturing Census for Boots and shoes, other than rubber. The data is from various issues of
Statistical Abstracts of the United States during the interwar years. The output price index is the
Shoe index (referred to as Boot and Shoe index in some early years of BLS publications). This index
is a subcomponent of the leather products group. Mack (1956) discusses the production structure of
the leather industry. She reports that tanned leather accounts for the majority of material costs in
(leather) shoe making. Based on this, it seems reasonable to use the price index for leather as the
gross input price. The source of these price indexes are various issues of the monthly Labor Review (in
the articles on \Wholesale Prices") as well as various issues of the Bureau of Labor Statistics annual
(bulletins) publication Wholesale Prices.
Lumber : The Federal Reserve gross output index for lumber production had a weight in the
overall index of 2:90. The output price index was based on milled wood products, mainly intended
for building.
Meat Packing: The Federal Reserve gross output index for meat packing is comprised of pork
and lard production (0:58
1:15), beef production (0:43
1:15), veal production (0:06
1:15), and lamb and mutton
production (0:08
1:15). Mack (1956) notes that meat packers were the source of just over half of the hides
used by leather tanners. These hides accounted for roughly 10 - 12 % of the value of a typical carcass,
and were the most valuable by-product of meat packers.
Paper and Pulp: The Federal Reserve gross output index for paper and pulp was broken out into
sub-indices for pulp (which in turn had 4 sub-indices: groundwood pulp (0:05
0:33), sulphate pulp (0:10
0:33),
sulphite pulp (0:15
0:33), and soda pulp (0:03
0:33),) and paper products (which in turn had 5 sub-indices:
27An alternative would be to construct an index using reported prices and the wights from the Federal
Reserve output index.
52paperboard production (0:72
2:16), ¯ne paper production (0:24
2:16), printing paper production (0:44
2:16), tissue
and absorbent paper production (0:21
2:16), and newsprint (0:09
2:16)). Many mills produced both pulp and
paper (especially newspaper). Intermediates were heavily biased towards wood pulp and energy.
Woolen: The Federal Reserve gross output index for wool textiles was broken out into sub-indices
for carpet wool production (0:29
3:38), apparel wool production (0:16
3:38), woolen yard production (0:45
3:38),
worsted yard production (0:32
3:38), and woolen and worsted cloth production (2:16
3:38). Prices of (raw) wool
were used to construct an input price index. The weights were those reported in Wholesale Prices
1929 (page 74) for nine grades of wool. The original prices for these goods were take from various
issues of Wholesale Prices. One rough measure of the usage of raw (scoured) wool is from Hyson
(1947) who reports the usage of scoured wool at mills for apparel.
Manufacturing: The price index for manufacturing is Manufactured articles (Cc112, Index 1926
= 100) from Table Cc109-112: Wholesale price indexes, by stage of processing: 1913-1951 [Bureau of
Labor Statistics], Historical Statistics of the United States.
53